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1269 
REBELLIOUS STATE CRIMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT AND THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
POWER 
MARY FAN

 
ABSTRACT 
The propriety of a new breed of state laws interfering in immigration 
enforcement is pending before the Supreme Court and the lower courts. 
These laws typically incorporate federal standards related to the 
criminalization of immigration (―crimmigration‖), but diverge 
aggressively from federal enforcement policy. Enacting states argue that 
the legislation is merely a species of ―cooperative federalism‖ that does 
not trespass upon the federal power over foreign affairs, foreign 
commerce, and nationality rules since the laws mirror federal standards. 
This Article challenges the formalist mirror theory assumptions behind the 
new laws and argues that inconsistent state crimmigration enforcement 
policy and resulting foreign affairs complications render the new spate of 
immigration policing laws infirm. The Article argues for the need to give 
due weight to statements of interest by the executive on the foreign affairs 
implications of rebellious state crimmigration enforcement.  
The Article argues that the caste-carving approach of the ―attrition 
through enforcement‖ multi-front attack strategy behind the laws 
contravenes national immigration enforcement policy and strains foreign 
relations. The analysis provides a basis for distinguishing the Supreme 
Court‘s recent decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, which 
upheld a state employer licensing regulation, from the current spate of 
legislation pending in the courts. The distinction that makes a difference is 
conflict with a national enforcement policy calibrated to avoid turning 
suspected foreign nationals into untouchable caste-like ―subjects of 
suspicion and abuse,‖ thereby marring community and international 
relations. The analysis in the crimmigration context also enriches our 
understanding of what cooperative—and uncooperative—federalism 
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enforcement means and the dangers of the phenomenon in areas of special 
national concern fraught with localized animosity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The theory that state laws creating immigration offenses avoid trespass 
on the federal power over foreign affairs,
1
 foreign commerce,
2
 and 
nationality rules
3
 as long as state laws mirror and enforce federal standards 
has gone viral.
4
 In a heated pre-election-year summer, several states 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Dep‘t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (collecting cases on the deference 
to the President on matters involving foreign affairs and national security and hesitance to intrude on 
executive authority); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293–94 (1981) (describing ―the generally accepted 
view that foreign policy was the province and responsibility of the Executive‖). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (―The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations . . .‖); see also, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 278–80 
(1875) (invalidating California statute imposing onerous bond on certain immigrants to deter entry 
because the U.S. Constitution reserves to the federal government alone the power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, craft regulations, and determine the manner of execution).  
 3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 4 (―The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization . . .‖).  
 4. See, e.g., 2011 Immigration-Related Laws, Bills and Resolutions in the States: Jan. 1–March 
31, 2011, NAT‘L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13114 (last 
visited May 26, 2012) (reporting on ―an unprecedented rate‖ of state immigration legislation and 267 
bills introduced in forty-two state legislatures on immigration law enforcement, primarily addressing 
immigration status checks on a lawful stop or detention); see also Brief of Amici Curiae States of 
Michigan, Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Nebraska, Northern Mariana Islands, Pennsylvania, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/2
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passed laws emboldened by this ―mirror theory‖5 even as Arizona 
petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Ninth Circuit‘s injunction 
against its internationally controversial template law.
6
 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on the question of the constitutionality of Arizona 
Senate Bill 1070.
7
 A host of lawsuits are pending against similar state 
immigration legislation, including a suit by the United States against 
Alabama‘s even more aggressive enactment.8 The oft-proffered rallying 
call of interventionist states is that if the federal government will not 
enforce its immigration laws to the satisfaction of the dissident states, then 
the states can and will step in by creating their own criminal immigration 
laws and civil disabilities.
9
  
Emboldened by the mirror theory, states argue that they are merely 
engaging in ―cooperative enforcement,‖ not inconsistent legislation.10 The 
standard argument is that as long as the constraints and duties imposed on 
 
 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 19, United 
States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae 
States] (―A State‘s enforcement of Congressionally-approved immigration standards does not establish 
new immigrations standards.‖); Brief Amici Curiae of Members of Congress in Support of Appellants 
and Partially Reversing the District Court at 26, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-16645) (brief of sixty-six members of Congress) (―Because S.B. 1070 mirrors federal 
immigration provisions, its plainly legitimate sweep is indisputable, and a facial challenge cannot 
succeed.‖). 
 5. See, e.g., Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H.B. 56, 2011 
Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4–5, 13–18 (2011); Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, 
H.B. 87, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 3, 7–8, 20 (Ga. 2011); S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st 
Reg. Sess. §§ 5, 16–26, 21, 24 (Ind. 2011); Utah Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act of 2011, H.B. 
497, 2011 Gen. Sess. §§ 3, 4, 8, 10, 11 (2011).  
 6. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming injunction against 
implementation in part of Arizona Senate Bill 1070), petition for cert. filed, 2011 WL 3562633 (U.S. 
Aug. 10, 2011) (No. 11-182). 
 7. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011).  
 8. E.g., United States v. Alabama, 443 F. App‘x 411 (11th Cir. 2011); Hispanic Interest Coal. v. 
Bentley, No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB, 2011 WL 5516953 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011); Ga. Latino Alliance 
for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 
F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011); Parsley v. Bentley, No. 5:11-cv-2736-SLB (N.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2011); 
United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011); Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, 
No. 2:11-cv-401, 2011 WL 7143098 (D. Utah May 11, 2011). 
 9. See, e.g., Appellants‘ Opening Brief at 1, 12, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 
2011) (No. 10-16645) (explaining that Arizona Senate Bill 1070 was enacted amid a backdrop of 
alleged federal ―non-enforcement of the federal immigration laws‖ and supplements in light of the 
Department of Homeland Security‘s alleged ―inability (or unwillingness) to enforce the federal 
immigration laws effectively‖); Brief of Amici Curiae States, supra note 4, at 6 (deploring the 
executive branch‘s challenge to Arizona Senate Bill 1070 as seeking to prolong a ―regulatory scheme 
whereby the executive branch may continue to selectively enforce—or selectively not enforce—the 
laws enacted by Congress‖).  
 10. See, e.g., Appellants‘ Opening Brief, supra note 9, at 16 (arguing that Arizona Senate Bill 
1070 constitutes permissible ―cooperative enforcement‖); Brief of Amici Curiae States, supra note 4, 
at 25 (similar).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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regulated people and entities by state immigration regulation are 
essentially the same as federal law, there is no constitutional infirmity.
11
 
The legal and popular debate is largely being framed by this formalist lens 
that focuses on congruence between the legal standards on the books. 
―Cooperation‖ is shallowly defined as mere formal congruence in 
standards between those defined by Congress and those enforced by the 
states. But the life of the law is more than its formal reflection.
12
 Executive 
enforcement policy brings the law into being in reality.
13
  
In our tripartite system of checks and balances, the President and 
executive enforcement policy play a crucial role in shaping the law in 
reality.
14
 Enforcement is a relatively neglected issue in the federalism 
literature, which largely focuses on regulatory power.
15
 Executive 
enforcement policy is particularly important when it comes to 
crimmigration—the criminalization of immigration—because executive 
discretion balances sensitive foreign affairs considerations that the 
constitutional structure entrusts to the national executive.
16
 Foreign affairs 
concerns are especially sensitive when it comes to states directing criminal 
law enforcement to focus on suspected non-nationals because this sparks 
other nations‘ fears that their members—whether lawfully or unlawfully 
present in the United States—will be demonized and treated as criminals 
because of national origin, language, culture, and race.
17
  
 
 
 11. This notion is the brainchild of current Kansas Secretary of State and former law professor 
Kris Kobach, who describes himself as the ―intellectual architect of the fight against illegal 
immigration.‖ KRIS KOBACH FOR SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.kriskobach.org/ (last visited May 
26, 2012). Kobach provided states a playbook for how to achieve ―attrition through enforcement‖ 
while ―avoid[ing] federal preemption‖ in ―a field in which the federal government enjoys plenary 
authority under Article I of the U.S. Constitution‖ through strategies such as ―enacting state-level 
crimes that mirror federal immigration crimes.‖ Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What 
States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 464, 465, 472 
(2008); see also Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal 
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 155, 157–63 (2008) [hereinafter Kobach, Attrition 
Through Enforcement] (expanding on attrition through enforcement strategy). 
 12. Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (explaining that the law is 
animated by the ―felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men‖). 
 13. See infra Part I.A.  
 14. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that it is the President‘s role to ―take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed‖).  
 15. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 702 (2011). 
 16. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489–90 (1999) 
(describing ―prosecutorial discretion‖ as ―a special province of the executive‖ ill-suited for inquiry and 
noting how the concerns are all the more acute in the immigration context because of the risk of 
revealing foreign policy objectives and foreign intelligence). 
 17. E.g., Mexico Roundup: Reactions to Approval of Arizona‘s SB 1070, on 27 Apr. 10, WORLD 
NEWS CONNECTION, Apr. 27, 2010 (collecting numerous articles expressing protest by Mexican 
leaders over the criminalization provisions in Arizona Senate Bill 1070 and concerns that the law will 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/2
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This Article challenges the standard mirror theory assumptions and 
argues that inconsistent state crimmigration enforcement policy and 
resulting foreign affairs complications render infirm the spate of new state 
immigration policing laws. Though federalism controversies 
predominantly focus on state power to regulate, one must not overlook the 
power to define enforcement policy.
18
 This Article argues that conflicting 
state immigration enforcement policy impermissibly intrudes on the 
national executive‘s foreign affairs power, even if the formally prescribed 
constraints on regulated persons are mirror images. State intervention in 
immigration enforcement cannot duck below the Constitution‘s carefully 
calibrated balance by mirroring form while trammeling the point of 
national supremacy.  
Divergent enforcement policies imperil sensitive foreign affairs and 
national security interests that constitute the rationale for national 
supremacy.
19
 Plenary power over foreign affairs has been vigorously 
decried as a basis for stripping immigrants of protections and shielding 
discriminatory immigration laws from judicial review.
20
 This Article 
argues, however, that plenary power principles counsel for judicial 
intervention when the states trammel on federal immigration enforcement 
authority to the detriment of the conduct of foreign affairs. 
This Article distinguishes the new state immigration laws seeking 
―attrition through enforcement,‖ which transform suspected undocumented 
workers into an untouchable caste, from the Legal Arizona Workers Act, a 
 
 
permit ―discrimination,‖ ―persecution,‖ and ―racial hatred‖ against people of Mexican origin as well as 
Hispanics generally); see also infra Part I.B for analysis of repeated diplomatic protests. 
 18. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law As the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 
2026 n.4 (2007) (noting the tendency to view ―preserving state regulatory autonomy as central to the 
project of federalism‖).  
 19. See infra Parts I.B and II.A for examples and analyses. 
 20. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control 
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1868 (2007) (noting that the plenary power doctrine 
frequently conflicts with the due process rights of non-citizens); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation‘s Last 
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 12–
21 (1998) (illuminating the racially discriminatory origins of the plenary power doctrine); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 
255, 255–56, 261–79 (discussing how the plenary power doctrine has averted judicial review of the 
impoverishment of immigrant rights and racially discriminatory immigration policies); Hiroshi 
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549–60 (1990) (analyzing the burdens on aliens raising 
constitutional claims because of the plenary power doctrine and how constitutional norms have to be 
vindicated in stealth); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (2008) (tracing how the plenary power doctrine permits vast 
power over non-citizens unbridled by the Constitution or courts and ―restrained only by the frail Due 
Process Clause‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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statute regulating employer licensing that was recently upheld in Chamber 
of Commerce v. Whiting.
21
 The distinction that makes a difference is 
conflict with a national enforcement policy calibrated to avoid turning 
suspected foreign nationals into untouchable caste-like ―subjects of 
suspicion and abuse,‖ thereby marring community and international 
relations.
22
 The conflict is manifested by the rare phenomenon of direct 
challenges to the state immigration legislation by the United States and 
filings documenting impairment of foreign relations, an area of traditional 
federal dominance.
23
 
The account of the complex calculus of crimmigration enforcement 
policy redresses the impoverished understanding of national executive 
discretion advanced by states defending intrusive immigration laws. States 
contend that ―resources and obstruction at the state or local law 
enforcement level‖ account for what they view as a suboptimal level of 
national immigration enforcement.
24
 On this assumption, advocates of 
state immigration criminalization argue that they are merely cooperating to 
enhance enforcement rather than acting at odds with the national 
executive, and express shock that the national executive has moved to 
enjoin state immigration laws.
25
 This oft-proffered argument misses the 
point that the national executive‘s crimmigration prosecutorial policies 
must balance much more complex factors—including foreign policy—in 
determining the optimal level of enforcement.
26
  
The analysis in the immigration context also enriches our 
understanding of what cooperative—and uncooperative—enforcement 
means. Formal congruency in legal standards for regulated persons and 
entities does not render federalism cooperative when enforcement policies 
and duties on law enforcement officers are at odds between the state and 
federal government. The immigration context is a prime example of the 
import of congruity in enforcement policy for the cooperative federalism 
claim to ring true because of the foreign policy concerns at stake.  
Part I argues that despite the claim of ―cooperative federalism‖ by 
defenders of the state laws, the state enactments are about uncooperative 
 
 
 21. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 22. See infra Part I. 
 23. See infra Parts I.C and III.B. 
 24. See, e.g., Appellants‘ Opening Brief, supra note 9, at 6. 
 25. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182 (U.S. 
Aug. 10, 2011) (―The legislation authorizes cooperative law enforcement and imposes sanctions that 
consciously parallel federal law. Despite that effort, the United States took the extraordinary step of 
initiating a suit to enjoin the law on its face before it ever took effect.‖). 
 26. See infra Part I. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/2
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enforcement challenging federal policy‘s balance of enforcement; 
protection for racial, cultural, and linguistic communities; and foreign 
policy commitments. Part II explores the dangers of rebellious state 
overenforcement contravening national enforcement policy through a 
caste-carving strategy that imperils foreign policy objectives. Part III 
explores how plenary power doctrine, though oft critiqued as protection 
stripping and a basis for judicial nonintervention, can inform in our 
contemporary context judicial intervention against overreaching state laws. 
This Part also argues for the need to give substantial weight to statements 
by the Executive on the propriety of state immigration control 
interventions because of sensitive foreign affairs implications.  
I. DISSENTING STATE CRIMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT  
While the focus of public and legal contestation is often on the content 
of the formal laws, it is in the opaque zone of prosecution and executive 
enforcement policy-making that the law that gets lived is forged.
27
 The 
vast breadth and span of criminal laws on everything from holding a 
marijuana cigarette to giving a ride to an undocumented immigrant make 
enforcement policy crucial to defining the law experienced in reality.
28
 Not 
everyone who falls within the wide span of the criminal law is 
prosecuted—even when caught.29 Nor is the investigative line pushed to 
the constitutional limit to ferret out and arrest every possible 
transgressor.
30
 Authorities exercise judgment in deciding which categories 
 
 
 27. See Lemos, supra note 15 (noting focus on formal laws in federalism literature and the need 
for attention to enforcement); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
125, 129–32, 174–89 (2008) (illuminating how prosecutorial policies and internal norms operate like 
law in a world where the law on the books accounts for only some of how the law in reality operates). 
 28. For a sample of the rich body of literature on the broad, deep, and ever-expanding reach of 
modern criminal law, see, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals 
and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 766–80 (2005); Erik Luna, The 
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 726 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 523–26 (2001). 
 29. For intriguing work on prosecutorial declinations, see, e.g., Richard S. Frase, The Decision 
To File Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 
247–78 (1980) (presenting data on federal prosecutorial declination decisions); Miller & Wright, supra 
note 27, at 134–54 (analyzing data on declinations by the New Orleans District Attorney‘s Office); 
Michael Edmund O‘Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis 
of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1444–84 (2004) (presenting data on main factors 
for declination by federal prosecutors); Michael Edmund O‘Neill, When Prosecutors Don‘t: Trends in 
Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 225, 251–75 (2003) (analyzing 
data on declinations by federal prosecutors). 
 30. For some of the wealth of work on police discretion not to arrest, see, e.g., KENNETH CULP 
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 5, 85 (1969) [hereinafter DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE] (finding that the law that is actually applied is based on officer discretion 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of cases are worth the fiscal and community costs of investigation and 
prosecution, and what degree or level of investigation and prosecution is 
warranted.
31
  
In the criminal context, enforcement judgment is typically locally 
tailored to be more responsive to community concerns and context.
32
 Even 
in areas of concurrent federal jurisdiction, such as securities or antitrust, 
oftentimes elected local enforcers may be more attuned to regional or local 
impact, have better information access, and pursue more ambitious reform, 
such as former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer‘s campaign 
against Wall Street misdealing.
33
 In the typical criminal context, the 
benefits of localism do not come at the cost of wreaking negative national 
externalities. Cleaning up the local burglary gang, heroin ring, or bid-
rigging racketeering enterprise, for example, improves the local 
community without undermining countervailing national interests.
34
 
Indeed, local campaigns may even have collateral national benefits, such 
as the tobacco probe by former Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore 
that massed into a forty-state movement, resulted in a large settlement, 
changed industry practices, and led to a criminal investigation.
35
  
 
 
rather than the law on the books); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 50–55 (1975) 
(interviewing Chicago police officers to examine reasons for nonarrest and finding that despite 
legislative mandate for ―full enforcement,‖ officers on the beat hold much discretion over the 
decision); MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF 
LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 73–80 (1973) (analyzing police decisions not to arrest for 
offenses as part of legitimate exercises of discretion); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO 
TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 98–126 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965) (studying reasons for arrest 
and nonarrest and how police dealt with plethora of criminal laws to enforce); William Terrill & 
Eugene A. Paoline III, Nonarrest Decision Making in Police-Citizen Encounters, 10 POLICE Q. 308, 
309–26 (2007) (conducting qualitative and quantitative research on factors influencing the police 
decision not to arrest). 
 31. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 30, at 129 (noting the influence of community interests in 
determining whether to arrest); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal 
Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 559 (1960) 
(noting that even when mandated, ―[f]ull enforcement . . . is not a realistic expectation‖ because 
authorities must act in accord with constitutional constraints, budgetary limitations, and competing 
interests (emphasis omitted)); O‘Neill, When Prosecutors Don‘t, supra note 29, at 225 (noting that 
scarcity of resources makes judicious exercise of discretion particularly important). 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 & n.3 (1995) (explaining that the states 
traditionally have had primary authority over criminal law enforcement); Stephen F. Smith, Localism 
and Capital Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 105, 110–12 (2011) (praising the virtues of 
localism in criminal law enforcement in ensuring responsiveness ―to the values, priorities, and felt 
needs of local communities‖). 
 33. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 15, at 721–27 (describing virtues of local enforcement).  
 34. See, e.g., Sally Roberts & Colleen McCarthy, Brokers Convicted in Bid-Rigging Trial, BUS. 
INS., Feb. 25, 2008, at 1 (reporting on bid-rigging convictions obtained by New York prosecutors 
against executives though civil racketeering claims were dismissed); Pervaiz Shallwani, Heroin Ring 
Is Busted, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2012, at A17. 
 35. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 15, at 733 (describing benefits of such campaigns); Frontline: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] REBELLIOUS STATE CRIMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1277 
 
 
 
 
When it comes to the criminalization of immigration, however, the 
balance of power and discretion is inverted because immigration 
implicates foreign relations policy, which is constitutionally committed to 
the federal government.
36
 The nation‘s constitutional structure does not 
permit a few fierce states attempting to intervene in immigration 
enforcement to undermine the larger interest of the nation in functional 
foreign policy facilitating beneficial trade and international cooperation.
37
 
As the Supreme Court ruled in another time of anti-immigrant furor and 
state intervention in immigration regulation: 
The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and 
subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and 
not to the States. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations: the responsibility for the character of these regulations, and 
for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national 
government. If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, 
embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.
38
  
For more than a century, states largely heeded the Court‘s clear ―keep out‖ 
message to states seeking to regulate immigration.
39
 Attempts to intervene 
have instead shifted to challenging federal enforcement policy and, most 
recently, aggressively and directly legislating to superimpose the 
immigration enforcement policy of a few states over national policy, to the 
objection of federal enforcers.
40
   
 
 
Inside the Tobacco Deal (PBS television broadcast May 12, 1998), available at http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/ (detailing tobacco litigation story). 
 36. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (―For local interests the 
several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign 
nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.‖). 
 37. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10 (1977) (―Control over immigration and 
naturalization is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to 
interfere.‖).  
 38. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875). 
 39. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of 
Immigration through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 268–69 (2011) (noting that ―for more than 130 
years, few scholars or state legislatures, and virtually no courts, imagined that states could develop 
their own immigration policies,‖ and until recently ―states avoided even the implicit claim that they 
could craft their own general immigration law or enforce federal immigration law in state courts‖). 
 40. For examples of legislation, see supra note 5. For objections by the United States to recent 
state immigration interventions, see, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 
(D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-01413); Plaintiff United States of America‘s Reply in Support of 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Bentley, 2011 WL 5516953 (N.D. 
Ala. Sept. 28, 2011) (No. 5:11–CV–02484–SLB). 
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A. The Battle over Crimmigration Enforcement Policy 
Legal and political polemic surrounding state attempts to intervene in 
immigration regulation frequently alleges that the federal government has 
―failed to enforce the immigration laws.‖41 On its face, the claim is 
inaccurate: the federal government has extensively enforced immigration 
laws, increasingly through criminal sanctions, which has led to massive 
ramp-ups in immigration prosecutions.
42
 The number of immigration 
prosecutions surged by 552 percent between 1994 and 2003: from 2,452 
cases to 15,997 cases.
43
 The high number of immigration prosecutions has 
continued, increasing 117.6 percent between 2005 and 2010
44—though the 
rate of undocumented immigration has dramatically receded by nearly 
two-thirds between 2007 and 2009 compared to the period 2000 to 2005.
45
 
The strength of the U.S. economy is a crucial factor influencing the ebb 
and flow of unauthorized migration.
46
 As the U.S. economy goes down, so 
 
 
 41. E.g., Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997); Chiles v. United States, 69 
F.3d 1094, 1096 (11th Cir. 1995); Appellants‘ Reply Brief at 9, Arizona v. United States, 641 F.3d 339 
(9th Cir. 1995) (No. 10-16645); Brief Amicus Curiae of Alan C. Nelson Foundation of Americans for 
Responsible Immigration in Support of Appellants Pete Wilson et al. at 7, League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-55388); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
American Unity Legal Defense Fund, Inc. in Support of Appellants and Reversal at 2–3, United States 
v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645); see also, e.g., Press Release, Speaker 
Hubbard Responds to Effort to Overturn New Immigration Law, July 8, 2011, available at 
http://www.rephubbard.com/Articles/Article.aspx?ai=85 (―If the federal government won‘t enforce its 
own laws and protect Alabama, we must protect ourselves.‖); Press Release, SC on the Brink of 
Passing Arizona-Style Illegal Immigration Law, June 21, 2011, available at http://bobbyharrell.com/ 
2011/06/21/release-house-vote-sends-immigration-bill-to-gov%E2%80%99s-desk/#more-1173 (―If 
Washington refuses to effectively support our law enforcement officers by enforcing immigration 
laws, it is left up to the states to stand up and do what is right.‖). 
 42. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagley, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1283 n.14, 
1301, 1322–37 (2010) (describing the fast-tracking of immigration prosecutions); Mary De Ming Fan, 
Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 1, 
36–41 (2007) (providing data on surges in immigration prosecution and imprisonment for immigration 
offenses). 
 43. See MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRENDS, 2003: 
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROGRAM, at 48 tbl. A.7 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/fcjt03.pdf (tabulating case category totals for 1994 and 2003). 
 44. Immigration Prosecutions for September 2010, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/ 
tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlysep10/fil/ (last visited May 26, 2012). 
 45. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D‘VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., U.S. UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRATION FLOWS ARE DOWN SHARPLY SINCE MID-DECADE i (2010), available at http://pew 
hispanic.org/files/reports/126.pdf.  
 46. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & ROBERTO SURO, PEW HISPANIC CTR., RISE, PEAK, AND DECLINE: 
TRENDS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION 1992–2004 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/ 
53.pdf.  
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too does the allure of braving the increasingly bristling gauntlet to migrate 
without authorization.
47
  
Parsing past polemic, the real point of disagreement is not over federal 
nonenforcement. Rather, the state contestation is over how aggressively to 
enforce the immigration laws and what environment of intimidation 
enforcers should seek to establish.
48
 Before the recent wave of direct 
legislative intervention, states such as Arizona, California, Florida, New 
Jersey, New York, and Texas had taken the indirect path of suing the 
United States over enforcement policy.
49
 The suits alleged that federal 
officials had failed to enforce the immigration laws and requested 
reimbursement for services to the undocumented.
50
 Courts dismissed the 
state challenges on the grounds of failure to state a colorable claim and as 
nonjusticiable political questions.
51
  
Courts uniformly held that nowhere did the Constitution or statutory 
laws impose a duty on the national government to enforce immigration to 
the level of the dissident states‘ liking, on pain of monetary damages.52 
Immigration policy is constitutionally committed to Congress and the 
national executive; the level of adequate enforcement or whether the 
government has allegedly neglected to protect against an ―alien invasion‖ 
is a nonjusticiable political question.
53
 Even had the claims been 
justiciable, moreover, ―[c]ourts must give special deference to 
congressional and executive branch policy choices pertaining to 
immigration.‖54 The Supreme Court has emphatically reiterated and long 
 
 
 47. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN 
ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 111 (2002).  
 48. See, e.g., Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 
2d Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ariz. 2010) (stating goal of ―attrition through enforcement‖); Kobach, Attrition 
Through Enforcement, supra note 11, at 163 (―The time has come to make attrition through 
enforcement the nationwide strategy of the federal government.‖); David A. Selden et al., Placing S.B. 
1070 and Racial Profiling into Context, and What S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in 
Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523, 544 n.53 (2011) (suggesting that the intent of the framers of anti-
immigrant legislation is to create an atmosphere of terror to drive out undocumented immigrants and 
Latinos more generally).  
 49. Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997); California v. United States, 104 
F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995); New Jersey v. 
United States, 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996); Texas 
v. United States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997).  
 50. See, e.g., Texas, 106 F.3d at 667 (summarizing claims).  
 51. Arizona, 104 F.3d at 1096; California, 104 F.3d at 1092, 1095; Chiles, 69 F.3d at 1096; New 
Jersey, 91 F.3d at 469; Padavan, 82 F.3d at 29; Texas, 106 F.3d at 665, 667.  
 52. California, 104 F.3d at 1091–95; Chiles, 69 F.3d at 1097; New Jersey, 91 F.3d at 466–69; 
Padavan, 82 F.3d at 26–29; Texas, 106 F.3d at 665–67.  
 53. California, 104 F.3d at 1091; Chiles, 69 F.3d at 1097; New Jersey, 91 F.3d at 470; Padavan, 
82 F.3d at 27; Texas, 106 F.3d at 665, 667.  
 54. Texas, 106 F.3d at 665.  
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recognized ―the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental 
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government‘s political departments 
largely immune from judicial control.‖55 
The striking aspect of the new state immigration laws is the direct and 
unabashed attempt to hijack the federal power to set immigration 
enforcement policy. The intellectual author of the strategy behind the spate 
of new laws, former law professor and current Kansas Secretary of State 
Kris Kobach, has deplored that ―the national immigration policy for the 
last decade has been one of triage—incarcerate alien smugglers and deport 
aliens involved in violent crimes, but do virtually nothing to enforce the 
law against garden-variety illegal aliens.‖56 He mapped a strategy through 
which states could enact ―mirror‖ state immigration laws that were 
formally similar to federal standards but really served as a vehicle for 
launching a competing enforcement policy, which he dubbed ―attrition 
through enforcement.‖57 The idea was to get immigrants to ―self-deport‖ 
by making it hard for suspected undocumented people to live everyday 
life, from getting a ride from someone to walking or driving down a street 
without having police demand papers.
58
  
While the wave of laws built on this strategy vary somewhat in their 
details, they generally launch a multi-front attack to create an environment 
of totalizing hostility, from criminalizing renting or giving rides to 
suspected aliens, to conscripting police into immigration checks during 
everyday law enforcement, such as traffic stops, to criminalizing job-
seeking and mere presence by unlawful aliens.
59
 A shared feature of the 
 
 
 55. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citing numerous cases reinforcing this doctrine).  
 56. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement, supra note 11, at 156.  
 57. Id. at 157–63.  
 58. Id.  
 59. See, e.g., Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H.B. 56, 2011 
Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4–5, 12–18 (2011) (requiring upon any lawful stop, such as a traffic stop, that law 
enforcement officers who have reasonable suspicion that the subject of a lawful stop, detention, or 
arrest is unlawfully in the United States to check immigration status with federal authorities; 
criminalizing ―harbor[ing]‖ and transport of aliens in ―reckless disregard‖ of alienage; penalizing 
employment-seeking by undocumented workers and employers that hire such workers; and requiring 
school officials to determine the immigration status of children); Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Enforcement Act of 2011, H.B. 87, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 3, 7–8, 20 (Ga. 2011) 
(authorizing officers to check immigration status where authorities have probable cause to believe the 
subject has committed an offense and the suspect is unable to supply specified identity documents, and 
providing immunity for officers who in good faith perform such immigration checks; criminalizing 
giving undocumented aliens rides; deterring employment of potential undocumented workers; and 
establishing a state ―Immigration Enforcement Review Board‖); S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st 
Reg. Sess. §§ 5, 16–26, 21, 24 (Ind. 2011) (requiring officers who make a lawful stop, detention or 
arrest to verify citizenship or immigration status from federal immigration authorities if there is 
reasonable suspicion the person stopped, detained or arrested is an unlawfully present alien; permitting 
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new laws is forcing state and local police, willing or not, into immigration 
surveillance.60 The goal, as Arizona State Senator Russell Pearce—the 
sponsor of the Arizona template law that sparked a host of new 
legislation—described it, is to create an ―unfriendly‖ environment with the 
hope that ―they will pick up and leave.‖61 Or as Arizona State 
Representative John Kavanagh, another bill sponsor, put it, ―it‘s about 
creating so much fear they will leave on their own.‖62 Similarly, Alabama 
State Representative Micky Hammon, co-sponsor of the even more 
aggressive Alabama House Bill 56, said the basic idea was to make illegal 
aliens‘ lives ―difficult and they will deport themselves.‖63 While the 
strategy is crafted with avoidance of formal regulatory preemption in 
 
 
arrests by state officers on probable cause to believe the person is an alien who is subject to a removal 
order or if other prescribed circumstances exist; and deterring renting to, or employing, unlawfully 
present persons); Utah Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act of 2011, H.B. 497, 2011 Gen. Sess. §§ 3, 
4, 8, 10, 11 (2011) (providing for immigration status checks of people lawfully stopped, arrested or 
detained where such subjects cannot provide documents presumptively indicating legal status; 
requiring immigration status checks for distribution of public benefits; criminalizing transportation or 
harboring of suspected undocumented aliens and providing for warrantless arrests based on reasonable 
cause to believe subject is an unlawful alien). 
 60. E.g., Ala. H.B. 56 §§ 5, 12, 18 (prohibiting, limiting or restricting enforcement of federal 
immigration laws and requiring full enforcement of federal criminal immigration law to the extent 
permitted by law; requiring that law enforcement officers who have reasonable suspicion that the 
subject of a lawful stop, detention or arrest is unlawfully in the United States check immigration status 
with federal authorities; and requiring reasonable efforts to determine citizenship upon arrest for 
driving without a license); Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, 
49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 2(A)–(B) (Ariz. 2010) (forbidding law enforcement from adopting a policy 
―that limits or restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent 
permitted by federal law‖ and requiring that ―for any lawful contact‖ by law enforcement officials 
―where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United 
States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of 
the person‖); Ind. S.B. 590 §§ 2–3 (prohibiting restrictions on immigration status investigations and 
requiring law enforcement officers making a lawful stop, detention or arrest to request verification of 
citizenship or immigration status if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is an 
unlawfully present alien); Utah H.B. 497 §§ 3, 6 (requiring officers conducting any lawful stop, 
detention or arrest to verify immigration status if documents indicating immigration status are not 
supplied and to investigate potential smuggling or transportation of illegal aliens based on reasonable 
suspicion of the offense and forbidding limitations or restrictions on state or local enforcement 
investigating immigration offenses); cf. Ga. H.B. 87 § 8 (forbidding prohibitions on law enforcement 
exchanging immigration status information and authorizing immigration status checks ―during any 
investigation of a criminal suspect by a peace officer, when such officer has probable cause to believe 
that a suspect has committed a criminal violation‖). 
 61. Amanda Lee Myers, Arizona Pushes Illegals to Leave, LONG BEACH PRESS TELEGRAPH, 
Dec. 23, 2007, at 10A.  
 62. Many Migrants, Legal and Illegal, Say They‘re Planning to Leave State, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Apr. 28, 2010, at A1. 
 63. Kim Chandler, House to Vote on Immigration Bill: Opponents Say It‘s Unconstitutional, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 5, 2011, at 3.  
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mind, it is unabashedly and boldly about contradicting perceived federal 
enforcement policy.
64
  
B. National Enforcement Policy and Externalities Management 
The precise content of national enforcement guidelines is hard to 
obtain. Officials guard investigation and prosecution guidelines closely—
and are accorded wide berth by courts to do so—because revelation of 
precisely which kinds of cases will be pursued or not would undermine 
criminal law‘s deterrent value, chill law enforcement, embolden law-
breakers, and trigger time-consuming litigation over the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, which is ill-suited for judicial review.
65
 The 
opacity surrounding prosecutorial guidelines is vigorously critiqued.
66
 
There are pragmatic deterrence reasons, however, to maintain popular 
focus on the broad scope of criminal law and to hope we ―pay no attention 
to that man behind the curtain‖67—the law enforcement discretion 
narrowing the scope of what actually is investigated and prosecuted in 
reality.  
For example, from a cost-efficient deterrence perspective, it is better to 
have the public focus on the law‘s general prohibition against shoplifting 
and leave shadowy what cases will actually get investigated and 
prosecuted. If, for example, people knew that only shoplifters who take 
more than twenty dollars worth of goods will be investigated and 
prosecuted because police have a lot of more important safety priorities to 
balance, it would be open season for poaching candy bars and other small, 
 
 
 64. See supra notes 41 and 56 and accompanying text.  
 65. The Supreme Court has explained: 
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the 
strength of the case, the prosecution‘s general deterrence value, the Government‘s 
enforcement priorities, and the case‘s relationship to the Government‘s overall enforcement 
plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. 
Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. 
Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law 
enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor‘s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, 
and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement 
policy. 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 
 66. See, e.g., DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 225 (arguing that prosecutorial 
discretion should be reined in by requiring public promulgation of guidelines indicating criteria for 
determining which cases will be prosecuted or declined); Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding 
the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10–18, 25–28 (1971) (arguing for 
publicizing quasi-legislative internal policy guidelines to control prosecutorial discretion); David A. 
Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor‘s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 537 (1999) 
(arguing for publicizing prosecution policies to promote dialogue and review). 
 67. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). 
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cheap, tempting sundries. The focus on the broader law and fantasy of 
omniscient enforcement enables a broader scope of regulation while the 
discretion to decline to investigate or prosecute ensures that limited 
resources are deployed most effectively to achieve long-range goals. One 
would not want resources unwisely drained by mechanically processing 
the vast array of everyday, small-time transgressors because there would 
be insufficient ability to pursue more serious crimes and longer-range 
targets that pose greater public dangers.
68
  
Publicly available guidelines give broadly worded, open-textured 
factors but generally do not disclose the precise calculus defining which 
cases law enforcement officials will not pursue. For example, the U.S. 
Department of Justice‘s U.S. Attorneys‘ Manual explains very generally: 
A. The attorney for the government should commence or 
recommend Federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person‘s 
conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the admissible 
evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a 
conviction, unless, in his/her judgment, prosecution should be 
declined because:  
1. No substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution;  
2. The person is subject to effective prosecution in another 
jurisdiction; or  
3. There exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to 
prosecution.
69
 
The Comment advises: ―Merely because the attorney for the government 
believes that a person‘s conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the 
admissible evidence will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, 
does not mean that he/she necessarily should initiate or recommend 
prosecution.‖70 Open-textured standards like ―no substantial Federal 
interest would be served‖ are fleshed in by more factors, including: 
1. Federal law enforcement priorities;  
2. The nature and seriousness of the offense;  
 
 
 68. For illuminating commentaries from jurists on the front lines, see, e.g., Juan R. Torruella, The 
―War on Drugs‖: One Judge‘s Attempt at a Rational Discussion, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 235, 256 (1997) 
(offering judicial perspective about the futility of mopping up an inexhaustible supply of the poor 
serving as drug mules rather than pursuing the more culpable). 
 69. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL § 9-27.220 (2009), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.220. 
 70. Id. § 9-27.220 cmt. 
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3. The deterrent effect of prosecution;  
4. The person‘s culpability in connection with the offense;  
5. The person‘s history with respect to criminal activity;  
6. The person‘s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or 
prosecution of others; and  
7. The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is 
convicted.
71
 
U.S. Attorneys, district attorneys, and other unit leaders may prescribe 
much more specific guidelines for line prosecutors screening cases.
72
 For 
example, prosecution guidelines might specify declination of drug cases if 
quantities are under a certain amount or declination of immigration cases 
if there are no violent or repeat felonies in the individual‘s record. The 
precise formula, however, is generally not subject to release.
73
  
Statements by law enforcement officials and enforcement campaigns 
give glimpses, however, of prosecution priorities and the complex calculus 
of factors balanced to determine who is pursued and who is ―cut loose.‖74 
In the crimmigration enforcement context, as in the exercise of criminal 
enforcement discretion generally, individuals with serious criminal records 
or whose activities may endanger safety are frequently openly identified as 
priority targets.
75
 Immigrations and Customs Enforcement and Customs 
and Border Patrol have programs targeting human smugglers, affiliates of 
drug trafficking organizations, and undocumented individuals with prior 
 
 
 71. Id. § 9-27.230. 
 72. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in 
Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 956 (2000) (discussing statute-specific 
guidelines).  
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Zimmerman, 967 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished mem. op.) 
(referring to denied request for disclosure of internal investigation and prosecution policies); Abrams, 
supra note 66, at 25–33 (noting that the historical general practice is not to publish prosecutorial policy 
and the myriad reasons for this position).  
 74. Oft-used law enforcement lingo for declinations, reflecting an apparent general predilection 
for fishing. Cf. Timothy J. McGinty, ―Straight Release‖: Justice Delayed, Justice Denied, 48 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 235, 270 (2000) (discussing how police face pressures ―to arrest or cut loose‖). 
 75. See, e.g., Press Release, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Operation Targeting At-
Large Violent Convicted Criminal Aliens Nets 95 Arrests (Dec. 13, 2010) [hereinafter ICE, Targeting 
At-Large Violent Criminal Aliens], available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1012/101213miami 
.htm (―Arresting convicted criminals and immigration fugitives is a top priority for ICE ERO [Office 
of Enforcement and Removal Operations]‖); Press Release, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
ICE Arrests 77 in Operation Targeting Criminal Aliens and Immigration Fugitives (Jan. 21, 2011), 
available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1101/110121grandrapids.htm (describing priorities of 
―arresting and removing at-large criminal aliens‖ and top priority focus on ―aliens who pose a threat to 
national security and public safety, including members of transnational street gangs and child sex 
offenders‖). 
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violent felony convictions.
76
 As is also often the case, for the reasons 
delineated above, the specific target of enforcement actions is not openly 
stated. But as the waves of immigration raids and deportations against 
―garden-variety‖ undocumented workers demonstrate, the federal 
government has done substantially more than ―virtually nothing.‖77 
Contrary to Kobach‘s accusation, everyday undocumented people have 
also been deported en masse.
78
 Federal officials have also deployed a 
geographically-focused prosecution program, called ―Operation 
Streamline,‖ to rapidly prosecute undocumented border-crossers in hot 
spots such as Arizona.
79
 
In going after everyday people, however, executive officials must 
balance sensitive community and foreign policy concerns. President 
Obama, the current national enforcer-in-chief, explained the balancing of 
community interests: 
Americans are right to be frustrated, including folks along border 
states. But the answer isn‘t to undermine fundamental principles 
that define us as a nation. We can‘t start singling out people because 
of who they look like, or how they talk, or how they dress. We can‘t 
turn law-abiding American citizens—and law-abiding immigrants—
into subjects of suspicion and abuse.
80
  
President Obama assured Mexican President Vicente Fox after the passage 
of the controversial Arizona Senate Bill 1070:  
And I want everyone, American and Mexican, to know my 
administration is taking a very close look at the Arizona law. We‘re 
examining any implications, especially for civil rights. Because in 
the United States of America, no law-abiding person—be they an 
 
 
 76. Declaration of David V. Aguilar, Deputy Comm‘r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection at 7, 
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-01413); ICE, Targeting 
At-Large Violent Criminal Aliens, supra note 75. 
77.  See text at supra note 56. 
 78. See, e.g., Leisy J. Abrego, Legal Consciousness of Undocumented Latinos: Fears and Stigma 
as Barriers to Claims-Making for First- and 1.5-Generation Immigrants, 45 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 337, 
354–55, 360–62 (2011) (describing immigrant fears stemming from surges in raids at work and school, 
such as the dramatic Postville, Iowa, raids and raids in California schools); Raquel Aldana, Of Katz 
and ―Aliens‖: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1092–
96 (2008) (describing ramp-up in worksite immigration raids in 2006 and the example of raids on six 
Swift & Company meatpacking plants).  
 79. Declaration of David V. Aguilar, supra note 76, at 7. 
 80. David Jackson, Obama Again Promotes ―Comprehensive‖ Immigration Bill—So What 
Now?, USA TODAY (May 6, 2010, 12:52 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/ 
2010/05/obama-re-affirms-support-for-comprehensive-immigration-reform/1. 
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American citizen, a legal immigrant, or a visitor or tourist from 
Mexico—should ever be subject to suspicion simply because of 
what they look like.
81
 
National leaders have been sensitive to the need to calibrate the means and 
level of enforcement in a manner that will not convert people of a 
particular—often racially, culturally, and linguistically marked—
appearance into a suspect and subjugated caste.  
Immigration enforcement policy is also directly informed by foreign 
policy. Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns has explained: 
U.S. immigration law—and our uniform foreign policy regarding 
the treatment of foreign nationals—has provided that the unlawful 
presence of a foreign national, in itself, ordinarily will not lead to 
that foreign national‘s criminal arrest, incarceration, or other 
punitive measures (e.g., legislated homelessness) but instead to civil 
removal proceedings. Unlawful presence is a basis for removal, not 
retribution. This is a policy that is understood internationally, that is 
consonant with multilateral resolutions expressing the view that an 
individual‘s migration status should not in itself be a crime, and that 
is both important to and supported by foreign governments. This 
policy has been the subject of repeated international discussions, 
and is firmly grounded in the United States‘ human rights 
commitments as well as our interest in having our own citizens 
treated humanely when abroad.
82
 
Enforcement policy also observes the longstanding goal, recognized by the 
Supreme Court, of balancing the need ―to ‗leave [aliens] free from the 
possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might . . . 
affect our international relations‘ and undermine ‗our traditional policy of 
not treating aliens as a thing apart.‘‖83 The need to pursue enforcement in a 
manner that does not create a suspect and maltreated caste also has 
important foreign policy implications because of the risk of marred 
relations and retaliation by other nations if their nationals are maltreated.
84
  
 
 
 81. Press Release, White House, Remarks by President Obama and President Calderón of 
Mexico at Joint Press Availability (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-calder-n-mexico-joint-press-availability. 
 82. Declaration of William J. Burns, Deputy Sec‘y of State ¶ 35, United States v. Alabama, 813 
F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (No. 2:11–CV–2746–SLB). 
 83. See Brief for Appellee at 47, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-
16645) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73–74 (1941)). 
 84. See Declaration of James B. Steinberg, Deputy Sec‘y of State at 2–5, United States v. 
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-01413). 
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II. THE DANGERS OF UNCOOPERATIVE CRIMMIGRATION 
OVERENFORCEMENT 
Despite claims of ―cooperative federalism‖ by defenders of the new 
spate of state immigration legislation, examining the dissenting states‘ 
approaches through the enforcement lens illuminates the reality of 
uncooperative enforcement. Uncooperative enforcement is a relatively 
neglected area of examination.
85
 A few recent forays have begun to 
examine how federal laws allowing for state enforcement may give the 
states opportunity to compete with and dissent from federal enforcement 
policy.
86
 The analyses call to mind as analogy James C. Scott‘s classic 
anthropological account of how subordinated groups, such as servants and 
serfs, covertly resist and critique domination while seeming to dutifully 
perform the roles prescribed by the official power structure.
87
 The two 
central articles on uncooperative enforcement celebrate the potential for 
enhancing participatory democracy by allowing local enforcers, while 
enforcing federal law, to experiment, pursue more aggressive strategies or 
neglected priorities, satisfy diverse and differing local tastes for 
enforcement, and provide an outlet for dissent.
88
  
But there is an important distinction between allowing the states an 
outlet by design under federal law and states staging a power-grab, 
sidestepping the deliberation and safeguards supplied by federal 
delegation. The dangers of states mutinying and seizing enforcement 
power from the federal government to pursue uncooperative enforcement 
policies remain little examined.
89
 The consequences of rebellious state 
crimmigration enforcement bring the dangers of uncooperative 
enforcement for the national interest sharply into focus.  
 
 
 85. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1258 (2009) (noting surprising neglect in federalism literature of how states implementing 
federal mandates can be a dissenter, rival, and challenger); Lemos, supra note 15, at 702 (critiquing 
neglect of states as enforcers in federalism literature focused on regulatory power). 
 86. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 85; Lemos, supra note 15. 
 87. See generally JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN 
TRANSCRIPTS (1992) (offering a canonical account of covert resistance by subordinated groups). 
 88. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 85, at 1285–93; Lemos, supra note 15, at 746–48, 753. 
 89. Lemos recognizes the risk of overenforcement and disuniformity but argues that ―such 
concerns have relatively little purchase in most of the areas where state enforcement exists today.‖ 
Lemos, supra note 15, at 764. She declines to examine the case of immigration because she views 
them as unauthorized enforcement outside the purview of her study. Id. at 700 n.5. 
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A. Caste-Carving State Immigration Enforcement  
The new breed of state legislation emboldened by the controversial 
Arizona Senate Bill 1070 contravenes national enforcement policy, which 
guards against both the carving of subjugated castes and foreign relations 
impairment. The fundamental aim of the ―attrition through enforcement‖ 
approach is a multi-pronged attack on suspected undocumented people 
that makes it hard to find housing, get a job, or even get a ride from a 
neighbor or walk down the street without having one‘s right to exist in the 
United States questioned.
90
  
This totalizing strategy of harnessing criminal law as well as imposing 
civil disabilities to create a hostile environment and untouchable caste 
driven to ―self-deport‖ distinguishes the new breed of law from 
predecessors.
91
 The framers of the law term the ―they‖ to be driven out 
―the illegals‖—a label so prevalent that it is now a noun in the English 
language.
92
 But, in practice, legal immigrants and even U.S. citizens are 
being driven out by the environment of hostility and unwelcome the 
legislation creates.
93
 The caste reaches beyond the category of formal 
illegal status because of prevalent heuristics—cognitive rules of thumb 
relying on stereotypes—based on race, language, and culture for who is a 
foreigner and who belongs.
94
  
 
 
 90. See supra note 59. 
 91. See, e.g., Shortfalls of the 1986 Immigration Reform Legislation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and Int‘l Law of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 75 (2007) (prepared testimony of Rosemary Jenks, Director of Government 
Relations, NumbersUSA) (―That solution is comprehensive enforcement, which many have called 
‗attrition through enforcement.‘ Everywhere enforcement has been seriously tried, we have seen 
predictable results: the message goes out to the illegal-alien community that a crackdown is underway, 
and behavior changes.‖); Luige del Puerto, Arizona Senate Primary Pits Pearce vs. Gibbons, ARIZ. 
CAPITOL TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008 (describing debate between competing Arizona political candidates 
over the ―attrition by enforcement‖ strategy of ―making things so miserable for immigrants in the hope 
that they would self deport‖); Myers, supra note 61 (―‗It‘s attrition by enforcement,‘ [Ariz. Sen. 
Russell Pearce, sponsor of S.B. 1070] said. ‗As you make this an unfriendly state for lawbreakers, I‘m 
hoping they will pick up and leave.‘‖); Susan Palmer, Waiting for Reform, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, 
Ore.), Aug. 6, 2007, at A1 (quoting Bob Dane, communicators director for the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform, as saying, ―[Stronger enforcement] makes it more difficult to live, 
work and travel here. It makes it easier to self deport.‖); Howard Witt, Where Have the Immigrants 
Gone?, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 10, 2008, at 3 (quoting Oklahoma State Representative Randy Terrill as 
saying, ―All you have to do is enforce the law, deny them the jobs, deny them the public benefits, give 
state and local law enforcement the ability to enforce federal immigration law, and the illegal aliens 
will simply self-deport‖). 
 92. Many Migrants, Legal and Illegal, Say They Are Planning to Leave State, supra note 62. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Scholars have noted that the formally aracial term ―alien‖ is saturated with racialized 
perception of ―undocumented Mexicans‖ and ―stereotypes about Mexicans as criminals.‖ See, e.g., 
Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/2
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In a contemporary context, where more than half of the foreign-born 
population in the United States is either from Mexico or south and east 
Asia,
95
 national origin, race, culture, and language are often used as overly 
broad proxies for illegal status.
96
 The anti-alien laws therefore broadly 
impact people perceived for racial, cultural, or linguistic reasons as 
foreign—even though they are lawfully present or even citizens—made to 
feel unwelcome and suspect in their home nation. The concern over 
racialized suspicion cuts across party lines, into the heart of an 
increasingly mixed-race America. Poignantly, for example, former 
Republican Florida Governor Jeb Bush worried that his mixed-race 
children, born of a mother from Mexico, would look suspicious walking 
down a street in Phoenix.
97
 
While the laws blend civil and criminal regulatory schemes, it is the 
conscription of police and deployment of state immigration 
criminalization—against non-citizens and citizens who might offer a 
neighborly ride or rent a room—that creates an atmosphere of hostile 
surveillance and renders suspected undocumented people an untouchable 
caste. The laws upend the experience and judgment of law enforcement 
honed from policing in immigrant communities. Through long experience 
in the field, many state and local police agencies have realized the need to 
foster trust with immigrant communities and have done so through ―non-
cooperation‖ policies—ordinances and directives providing that state and 
local police are not in the business of enforcing federal immigration law.
98 
 
 
Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 165, 171 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); see also, e.g., MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE 
SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 58 (2003) (tracing the history of 
how Mexicans emerged as ―iconic illegal aliens‖). 
 95. According to the most recent census data available, in 2009, Mexico exceeded all other 
nations and regions as the biggest source of the foreign-born population. See PEW HISPANIC CTR., 
STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at tbl. 1 
(2011), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/foreignborn2009/2009%20FB%20Profile 
%20Final.pdf (tabulating data from the Census Bureau‘s American Community Survey). After 
Mexico, which accounted for 29.9 percent of the foreign-born population, the regional category of 
south and east Asia accounted for 24.1 percent. Id. Forty-four percent of the foreign-born population 
was from Mexico, Central America, or Latin America. Id. 
 96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 97. Kirk Mitchell, Jeb Bush: States Look Wrong Way at Border Issue, DENVER POST, Dec. 5, 
2010, at B1. 
 98. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-01413) 
(noting that at least seventy-three cities, towns, counties, and states, including Los Angeles, D.C., 
Seattle, San Francisco, and New York City, have at various times had such ―non-cooperation‖ 
provisions to encourage community trust); Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by the Center on the 
Administration of Criminal Law in Support of Appellee-Plaintiff The United States of America at 11, 
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645). 
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The policies are fashioned to ameliorate the problems of valuable 
intelligence being lost because of witnesses fearing to step forward
99
 and 
crime victims fearing to turn to police.
100 
The new state immigration laws 
override these police policies and generally conscript state and local 
police, even if unwilling, into enforcing federal immigration law.
101
 To 
add fiercer teeth, some of the laws give disgruntled citizens a cause of 
action to sue police for perceived policies limiting or restricting 
enforcement of federal immigration law.
102
 Public safety professionals 
have protested that the conscription undermines public safety by eroding 
the delicate trust built with immigrant communities to foster intelligence 
gathering and crime fighting, and prevent predation on vulnerable 
undocumented persons.
103
 
The laws impose new duties on state and local police to check 
immigration status and enforce immigration laws. Arizona Senate Bill 
1070, for example, requires that law enforcement officers in any ―lawful 
contact‖ determine immigration status if ―reasonable suspicion exists that 
the person is an alien who is unlawfully present‖ unless ―the determination 
may hinder or obstruct an investigation.‖104 The Arizona law also 
 
 
 99. The concern about intelligence being lost for lack of trust of police is particularly acute as 
community policing turns to national security policing in immigrant Muslim communities. See, e.g., 
Jytte Klausen, British Counter-Terrorism After 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to the Fight Against 
Domestic Terrorism, 35 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 403 (2009); Basia Spalek, Community 
Policing, Trust, and Muslim Communities in Relation to ―New Terrorism‖, 38 POL. & POL‘Y 789 
(2010). 
 100. See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration Enforcement: A 
Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 36–43 (2006); Orde F. 
Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 
1476–90 (2006); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the 
Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1381–91 (2006). 
 101. See supra note 60. 
 102. E.g., Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 5(d) (2011) (allowing U.S. citizens and lawfully present aliens resident in Alabama to sue 
for civil penalties); Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 
2d Reg. Sess. § 2(G) (Ariz. 2010) (permitting civil suits to challenge alleged policies restricting state 
or local enforcement of immigration law for monetary penalties); S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st 
Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ind. 2011) (giving cause of action to persons domiciled in Indiana). 
 103. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Arizona‘s Effort to Bolster Local Immigration Authority 
Divides Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2010, at A16 (noting concerns of opponents, such as 
the Arizona Association of Chiefs of Police, and division among law enforcement community over the 
legislation); Tim Gaynor, Arizona Police Officer Challenges Migrant Law, REUTERS, June 5, 2010, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6541T320100605 (reporting concern among 
police chiefs and beat officers in Hispanic communities); Police Weighing Bill‘s Impact, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 2010, at A1 (noting concern of former Mesa Police Chief that the legislation 
would have ―catastrophic impacts on community policing‖). 
 104. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. 
Sess. § 2(B) (Ariz. 2010). 
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authorizes state and local police to engage in warrantless arrests based on 
probable cause of civil removability.
105
 Alabama House Bill 56 similarly 
requires that on ―any lawful stop, detention, or arrest‖ a reasonable attempt 
must be made to determine citizenship and immigration status where 
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully 
present unless the determination would hinder or obstruct an 
investigation.
106 
Other recently enacted laws also levy similar mandates on 
police.
107
 In a world of many traffic regulations and a vast universe of 
reasons that may be cited as suspicion for a stop,
108
 the laws mean 
omnipresent immigration regulation by state and local police.  
When it comes to amorphous standards such as reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause, the looming specter of race has shadowed the 
standard, even before Terry v. Ohio found two black men repeatedly 
walking past a store window and conferring with a white man constituted 
reasonable suspicion.
109 
As originally enacted, the template Arizona law 
on police checks and reasonable suspicion provided that officers ―may not 
solely consider race, color or national origin.‖110 The proviso draws on the 
Supreme Court‘s 1975 decision in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
providing that race can be a relevant—albeit not sole—factor in 
establishing reasonable suspicion of alienage.
111
 Brignoni-Ponce held that 
―[t]he likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is 
high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing 
alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are 
 
 
 105. Id. § 2(E). 
 106. Ala. H.B. 56 § 12(a).  
 107. E.g., Utah Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act of 2011, H.B. 497, 2011 Gen. Sess. § 3 
(2011) (requiring officers conducting any lawful stop, detention or arrest to verify immigration status 
if documents indicating immigration status are not supplied); Ind. S.B. 590 § 3 (requiring law 
enforcement officers making a lawful stop, detention or arrest to request verification of citizenship or 
immigration status if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is an unlawfully present 
alien). 
 108. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808, 810 (1996) (noting the myriad spongy traffic 
laws that give police bases for a stop, including driving at a perceived ―unreasonable speed,‖ driving 
too slow, or appearing not to give ―full time and attention‖ to driving); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 
(1968) (finding reasonable suspicion based on observations of two black men walking repeatedly past 
a store window and conferring with a third white man).  
 109. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11 (noting that stop and frisk tactics were a ―major source of friction 
between police and minority groups‖).  
 110. See Ariz. S.B. 1070 § 2(B) (―A law enforcement official or agency of this state or a county, 
city, town or other political subdivision of this state may not solely consider race, color or national 
origin in implementing the requirements of this subsection except to the extent permitted by the United 
States or Arizona Constitution.‖). 
 111. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975). 
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aliens.‖112 As controversy and litigation loomed, the Arizona legislature 
amended Senate Bill 1070 to delete the adjective ―solely.‖113 As amended, 
the law provides that officials may not consider race, color, or national 
origin ―except to the extent permitted by the United States or Arizona 
Constitution.‖114 As the Constitution has been interpreted in Brignoni-
Ponce, that means race can be a relevant factor, but not the sole factor. 
The allowance for race as a basis of suspicion is what the law openly said 
before, now obscured with a legal sleight of hand to provide cover.
115 
 
The disguise was so clever that the District Court of Arizona 
apparently read the revision without taking into account the proviso 
―except to the extent permitted by the . . . Constitution‖ and discussed the 
law for preliminary injunction purposes as if it barred consideration of 
race, color, or national origin.
116
 The sleight of hand has slipped into 
subsequent laws in states such as Alabama, Georgia, and Utah,
117 
though 
Indiana has declined to do so.
118 
Thus, the state immigration laws create an 
atmosphere of unwelcome for anyone who might be suspected of being a 
foreign national in a nation where race has been deemed a relevant factor 
for suspicion of unbelonging.  
While state and local police are transfigured into the central emblem of 
unwelcome, the state laws also deploy criminal laws to chill private 
interaction with suspected undocumented people. Private citizens are 
deterred through the threat of criminal conviction by state laws 
criminalizing transporting or harboring illegal aliens.
119 
A neighborly act 
 
 
 112. Id.; see also Kevin R. Johnson & Gabriel J. Chin, Profiling‘s Unlikely Enabler: A High Court 
Ruling Underpins Ariz. Law, WASH. POST, July 13, 2010, at A15 (critiquing the Brignoni-Ponce 
decision and its consequences). 
 113. H.B. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 3(B) (Ariz. 2010). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886–87. 
 116. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 989 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 117. E.g., Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 12(c) (2011) (―A law enforcement officer may not consider race, color, or national origin 
in implementing the requirements of this section except to the extent permitted by the United States 
Constitution or the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.‖); Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement 
Act of 2011, H.B. 87, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 8 (Ga. 2011) (―A peace officer shall not 
consider race, color, or national origin in implementing the requirements of this Code section except to 
the extent permitted by the Constitutions of Georgia and the United States.‖); Utah Illegal Immigration 
Enforcement Act of 2011, H.B. 497, 2011 Gen. Sess. § 3(5) (2011) (―A law enforcement officer may 
not consider race, color, or national origin in implementing this section, except to the extent permitted 
by the constitutions of the United States and this state.‖).  
 118. See S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ind. 2011) (―This chapter shall be 
enforced without regard to race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or national origin.‖). 
 119. E.g., Ind. S.B. 590 § 5 (incorporating federal prohibitions on transporting or attempting to 
transport an alien or harboring an alien knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has 
come to, entered or remains in the United States in violation of law); Ga. H.B. 87 § 7 (providing that 
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such as giving someone a ride—―transporting‖—may incur criminal 
consequences.  
Some states also define harboring broadly—potentially even more 
broadly than federal law. Georgia, for example, defines harboring to mean 
―any conduct that tends to substantially help an illegal alien to remain in 
the United States‖ with exclusions for such humanitarian or emergency 
situations such as services to infants, children or crime victims or 
emergency services.
120
 Among the most aggressive of the new laws, 
Alabama House Bill 56 criminalizes providing housing by defining that 
conduct as criminal harboring.
121
 The risk of creating a generally hostile 
atmosphere for people perceived as foreign—whether legally present or 
not—is aggravated by the fact that some of the state laws criminalize 
transportation or harboring based on reckless disregard of alienage.
122
 
Criminal laws are thus used to chill everyday hospitality among the 
general public—at least when it comes to interacting with people who 
might be perceived as foreign.  
Thus the new laws‘ strategy of creating a hostile and fear-ridden 
environment carve an overbroad caste of untouchables based on suspicion 
of unbelonging, which is racially, linguistically, and culturally marked. 
The immigration enforcement strategy of the states is to make unlawful 
presence a matter for multi-pronged totalizing retribution, rather than 
removal, contrary to national enforcement policy and foreign policy 
commitments.
123
 
B. Foreign Policy Impairment 
The flurry of diplomatic protests, threats of boycott, and impaired 
cooperation demonstrates the foreign policy externalities imposed by a 
 
 
―[a] person who, while committing another criminal offense, knowingly and intentionally transports or 
moves an illegal alien in a motor vehicle for the purpose of furthering the illegal presence of the alien 
in the United States‖ or those who, while ―acting in violation of another criminal offense and who 
knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields an illegal alien from detection . . . when such person knows 
that the person . . . is an illegal alien‖ are guilty of crimes); Utah H.B. 497 § 10 (criminalizing 
transportation, moving or attempting to move or harboring an alien for commercial advantage or 
private financial knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien is unlawfully present).  
 120. Ga. H.B. 87 § 7. 
 121. Ala. H.B. 56 § 12(4) (criminalizing ―[h]arbor[ing] an alien unlawfully present in the United 
States by entering into a rental agreement . . . with an alien to provide accommodations, if the person 
knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in the United States.‖). 
 122. E.g., id.; Utah H.B. 497 § 10. 
 123. See generally Declaration of William J. Burns, supra note 82 (describing transgression of 
federal immigration policy, informed by foreign policy and relations).  
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few highly vehement dissident states.
124
 The impact in international 
relations, perception, and cooperation was immediate. After Arizona 
enacted Senate Bill 1070, Mexican President Felipe Calderón denounced 
the law as ―inhumane, unacceptable, discriminatory and unfair‖ and an 
―obstacle‖ to cooperation with the United States to finding solutions to 
shared transnational problems.
125
 The Mexican Ambassador Arturo 
Sarukhan tweeted that the law was ―racial discrimination‖ and said that 
Mexico would ―use every diplomatic, political, and economic resource at 
hand to respond to the signing of the bill.‖126 The implications are 
substantial because Mexico is the third largest trading partner of the 
United States and the second largest purchaser of U.S. exports.
127
 
Mexico also took the unusual step of issuing a caution to its citizens 
regarding travel to Arizona, warning Mexican travelers that they faced ―a 
political environment adverse to communities of migrants and all Mexican 
visitors‖ and ―it should be assumed that any Mexican citizen could be 
bothered and questioned for no other reason at any moment.‖128 Mexican 
politicians discussed a potential boycott but ultimately determined instead 
to pursue legal actions.
129
 Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa 
Cantellano said the bill ―affects relations between Arizona and Mexico and 
forces the Mexican Government to review the feasibility and usefulness of 
cooperation agreements‖ with Arizona.130  
Denunciations also came from across the Americas. The twelve-
member Union of South American Nations summit expressed concern the 
law would ―legitimize racist attitudes‖ against immigrants to the United 
States, the vast majority of whom are Latin Americans.
131
 The Secretary-
General of the Organization of American States, José Miguel Insulza, also 
decried the law as ―clearly discriminatory.‖132 Mexican President Calderón 
 
 
 124. See Mexico Roundup, supra note 17 (collecting international outcry). 
 125. Id.; President Felipe Calderón, Mexican Congress Denounce New Arizona Law Targeting 
Undocumented Immigrants, SOURCEMEX ECON. NEWS & ANALYSIS ON MEX., Apr. 28, 2010. 
 126. Silvia Otero, Mexican Ambassador Calls Arizona‘s SB1070 ‗Racial Discrimination‘, WORLD 
NEWS CONNECTION, Apr. 27, 2010.  
 127. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32934, U.S.-MEXICO ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS: TRENDS, ISSUES, AND IMPLICATIONS 1–5 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
row/RL32934.pdf.  
 128. President Felipe Calderón, supra note 125.  
 129. Mexican Daily Declares Boycott Unviable, Calls for Legal Action Against Arizona Law, 
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Apr. 28, 2010. 
 130. Otero, supra note 126.  
 131. South American Summit Slams Arizona Immigration Law, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 4, 
2010, available at http://www.france24.com/en/20100504-south-american-summit-slams-arizona-
immigration-law. 
 132. President Felipe Calderón, supra note 125.  
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indicated that the law was not being viewed as business as usual as both 
Mexican political parties united to consider retaliatory measures.
133
 In 
protest, Mexico postponed approval of a U.S.-Mexico agreement on 
international emergency cooperation on natural disasters and accidents.
134
 
Faced with the international outpouring of dismay, President Obama 
strongly criticized the legislation, even though presidents very rarely 
critique state legislation.
135
 Like other world leaders, President Obama‘s 
strongest apparent concern was over the deployment of criminal law and 
police to conduct immigration surveillance based on suspicion of 
foreignness. In a speech, the President underscored that immigration 
enforcement must not subject people to suspicion based on appearance.
136
 
The presidential conciliatory statement was widely cited by protesting 
foreign leaders, spreading some salve over inflamed relations.
137 
 
The subsequent passage of new legislation emboldened by Arizona‘s 
example in states such as Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina further 
impaired relations, however. With each new law, the Mexican Foreign 
Ministry issued statements of mounting concern over strained relations.
138 
When Utah joined the spate of dissident legislation, the Mexican Embassy 
reiterated in increasingly stronger language: 
Utah‘s actions on this specific issue are detrimental to the robust 
relationship that Mexico and the United States have built as partners 
and neighbors in such important issues as enhancing economic 
competitiveness and trade, cooperating against transnational 
organized crime, promoting clean energy and combating climate 
change, and creating a more modern and efficient border. As has 
unfortunately been the case in other states in this country, where 
similar bills have been enacted, the Government of Mexico is 
concerned about the adverse impact initiatives such as Utah‘s HB 
497 may have on the breadth and scope of our bilateral 
relationship.139 
 
 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Archibold, supra note 103. 
 136. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 137. See, e.g., Mexico Roundup, supra note 17 (citing examples).  
 138. See, e.g., Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Mexican Government Regrets 
Passage of HB 87 in Georgia (May 13, 2011); Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 
Mexican Government Regrets that HB56 Has Been Signed Into Law in Alabama (June 9, 2011); Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Government of Mexico Regrets that S20 Has Been Signed 
into Law in South Carolina (June 28, 2011). 
 139. Press Release, Statement by the Embassy of Mexico on Lawsuit Filed Against HB 497 in 
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In briefs filed in pending lawsuits against the legislation, Mexico 
underscored that the legislation ―adversely impacts U.S.–Mexico bilateral 
relations, Mexican citizens and other people of Latin-American descent 
present in Arizona.‖140 Mexico noted that cross-border collaboration on 
issues of mutual concern, such as stemming the violence from drug-
trafficking organizations, was threatened by the atmosphere of hostility 
and mistrust occasioned by the divergent state policies.
141
 The ―grave 
concerns‖ expressed by Mexico were echoed by the governments of 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, demonstrating the ripple effect in impaired 
foreign relations.
142
 
III. PLENARY POWER AS A PROTECTION AGAINST STATE 
OVERENFORCEMENT  
The foreign policy consequences of the new breed of state immigration 
intervention beget the question of whether the plenary power cases of the 
past have bearing on our present. A distinguished array of scholars, 
including Jennifer Chacón, G. Jack Chin, Stephen H. Legomsky, Hiroshi 
Motomura, Juliet Stumpf, and others, have illuminated how the doctrine of 
plenary power over immigration has worked to strip non-citizens of 
constitutional protections, shield racial discrimination, and justify judicial 
nonintervention.
143
 In our contemporary context, however, the principles 
used to justify plenary power can be a basis for protection against the new 
strategy of dissentient state laws encroaching on executive enforcement 
policy. 
 
 
Utah (May 3, 2011). 
 140. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae United Mexican States in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, 
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645); see also Brief of the United 
Mexican States As Amicus Curiae In Support of Plaintiffs‘ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief at 2, Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Bentley, 2011 WL 5516953 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011) (No. 
5:11–CV–02484–SLB). 
 141. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae United Mexican States in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra 
note 140, at 11–12; see also Brief of the United Mexican States As Amicus Curiae In Support of 
Plaintiffs‘ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 140, at 7–10 (describing 
impairment of bilateral collaboration on diverse issues such as trade and emergency preparedness). 
 142. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the United Mexican States in Support of Respondents at 1, 
Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012); Motion of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay for Leave to Join the United Mexican States as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1, Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182 (U.S. Mar. 26, 
2012). 
 143. See supra note 20. 
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A. A Bulwark Against Localized Animosity  
The plenary power cases are usually taken as a ―keep out‖ sign to the 
judiciary when it comes to decisions by executive officials to exclude or 
expel aliens. One of the strongest rationales for judicial hesitance to 
intervene is potential interference in the management of foreign relations, 
entrusted to the national executive. Justifying its deference to executive 
discretion in Asian alien expulsion and exclusion cases, the Supreme 
Court explained in Fong Yue Ting v. United States:  
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting 
international relations, is vested in the political departments of the 
government . . . to be executed by the executive authority . . . except 
so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by 
statute, or is required by the paramount law of the Constitution, to 
intervene.
144
 
The twentieth-century Supreme Court further underscored the need for 
deference to the national executive‘s enforcement discretion—and not just 
Congress—because of foreign affairs implications, writing:  
The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The 
right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent 
in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation. 
When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility 
of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is 
implementing an inherent executive power.
145
 
Plenary power doctrine generally is associated with judicial 
nonintervention in controversial cases of expelling or excluding racially or 
politically defined undesirables with minimal process.
146
 The principles 
that animate the plenary power doctrine, however, have sparked vigorous 
judicial intervention when states vent parochial animosities. In choosing 
 
 
 144. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893). 
 145. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (citing United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 
(1893)).  
 146. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89, 591 (1952) (affirming 
deportation of longstanding residents based on retroactive application of an anti-communist statute by 
explaining that ameliorating the harsh consequences was ―a subject for international diplomacy‖ that 
―must be entrusted to the branches of the Government in control of our international relations and 
treaty-making powers‖ because ―any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with 
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the 
maintenance of a republican form of government‖).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1298 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:1269 
 
 
 
 
between the alien and the national government, plenary power doctrine 
directs deference to the national government, to the detriment of the alien. 
In choosing between conflicting state and federal immigration 
enforcement policies, however, the foreign affairs concerns behind the 
plenary power doctrine call for deference to the national executive. These 
principles of power may inure to the benefit of the alien in striking down 
conflicting state policies and laws.  
This reading is well-anchored in precedent. During another period of 
furious state attempts to intervene in immigration enforcement in the late 
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court in Chy Lung v. Freeman and Smith 
v. Turner firmly struck down state anti-alien laws.
147
 Defenders of the new 
breed of laws argue that the past cases invalidating state interference with 
the national power over immigration do not apply to the new laws.
148
 The 
states base their arguments of validity on the claim that they do not add to 
or subtract from federal standards for alien admissibility—assuming that 
superficial formal congruence is all that matters.
149
 However, the historical 
context surrounding the key case of Chy Lung v. Freeman reveals a richer 
analysis and the potential for the plenary power doctrine to serve as a 
bulwark—albeit as unstable and mercurial as national politics—against 
local animosity. 
The bogeyman of the era leading up to Chy Lung was the ―Chinaman‖ 
(and woman, typically viewed as a debauched prostitute or paramour).
150
 
In echoes of the present, times were getting tougher since the boom of the 
 
 
 147. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 277 (1875) (invalidating California law imposing hefty 
bond of $500 in gold on arriving shipping passengers the state-appointed ―Commissioner of 
Immigration‖ determines ―is lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, or infirm‖ or otherwise ―is 
likely to become a public charge, or has been a pauper in any other country, or is from sickness or 
disease . . . a public charge, or likely soon to become so, or is a convicted criminal, or a lewd or 
debauched woman‖); Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283, 284 (1849) (invalidating a 
New York head tax of $1.50 on every arriving cabin passenger and one dollar on every arriving 
steerage passenger as improper interference with the federal power to coordinate regulation of foreign 
commerce). 
 148. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Justice and Freedom Fund in Support of the Appellants 
Seeking to Reverse the District Court Opinion at 5, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 
2011) (No. 10-16645) (arguing that Chy Lung and Henderson do not apply because ―[t]he law is 
premised on federal definitions and does not ‗add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by 
Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States‘‖ (quoting De 
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.6 (1976))). 
 149. Id. 
 150. For an illuminating history, see, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the 
Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 652–64 (2005). Part of the following 
discussion of the history surrounding the key cases draws heavily from Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial 
Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-"Alien" Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for 
Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905 (2011) on interest-convergence between 
immigrant out-groups. This subsection reads the history through the lens of rebellious enforcement. 
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1850s drew Chinese to the goldfields, swamps, and mountains of America 
to clear the land and lay the tracks for a rapidly expanding economy.
151
 
When severe recession seized the United States in the 1870s, ―many 
thousands of unemployed men‖ were saying ―with great bitterness that but 
for [the Chinaman‘s] presence work and bread would be plenty.‖152 The 
Chinese were accused of degrading labor and displacing white workers, of 
being by nature ―voluntary slaves,‖ capable of subsisting and living 
cheaply like vermin and sending their wages back to China rather than 
spending them in the United States.
153
  
Anger was particularly fierce in California, which had larger 
concentrations of Chinese workers. Anti-Chinese campaigners warned that 
masses of Chinese would render America an ―Asiatic state‖154 and that in 
San Francisco, ―the constant dashing of a dark wave of immigration 
making daily more and more inroad on the white portion of the city‖ was 
an ―invasion‖ that threatened to render San Francisco a ―purely Asiatic 
city unless some means are devised to avert this calamity.‖155 The fear 
over the racial transformation of California presents a parallel with 
contemporary fears, as voiced by Senator Russell Pearce—sponsor of 
 
 
 151. On the ―[c]oming to Gold Mountain,‖ see, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN 
WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (2006). 
 152. Congressman Horace Davis, Speech on Chinese Immigration in the House of Representatives 
3 (June 8, 1878) [hereinafter Davis, Speech], available at http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb 
7h4nb21q/?order=3&brand=calisphere; see also, e.g., An Address from the Workingmen of San 
Francisco to Their Brothers Throughout the Pacific Coast 2 (Aug. 16, 1888), available at http://content 
.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb7199n8g9/?order=2&brand=oac (summarizing recession-decades‘ animosity 
towards the Chinese, accusing them of bringing blight wherever they spread so that ―white laborers all 
over the State were not wanted except at starving rates of wages‖ and the ―cities soon became crowded 
with white men seeking employment‖). 
 153. See, e.g., COMM. OF SENATE OF CAL., CHINESE IMMIGRATION: THE SOCIAL, MORAL AND 
POLITICAL EFFECT OF CHINESE IMMIGRATION 7, 41 (1877) [hereinafter 1877 SENATE OF CAL. 
REPORT], available at http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb538nb0d6/?order=2&brand=oac (referring 
to the Chinese as ―voluntary slaves‖ subsisting ―like vermin‖); JOSEPH M. KINLEY, REMARKS ON 
CHINESE IMMIGRATION 1, 3–5, 11 (1877), available at http://www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb3d5 
n996b/?order=2&brand=oac4 (quasi-slave labor); Senator Aaron A. Sargent, Speech on Immigration 
of Chinese in the United States Senate 1, 6 (May 2, 1876) [hereinafter Sargent, Speech], available at 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb0j49n3vp/?order=2&brand=oac4 (explaining that the ―very 
industries‖ of ―this strange and dangerously unassimilative people‖ were a vice displacing white 
workers); Gen. A.M. Winn, President, Mechanics‘ State Council of California, Valedictory Address 4–
5 (Jan. 11, 1871) [hereinafter Winn, Valedictory Address], available at http://www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/ 
13030/hb2779n54f/?order=2&brand=oac4 (decrying the futility of competing against nomads with no 
families to support, packed into squalid living conditions and toiling endlessly without spending); cf. 
AUGUSTUS LAYRES, EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON THE PACIFIC COAST IN FAVOR OF CHINESE 
IMMIGRATION 10–11 (1879), available at http://www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb8j49n9mf/?order 
=2&brand=oac4 (noting, in a pro-Chinese pamphlet, the irony that the very docility, industriousness, 
and frugality of the Chinese were arguments against them). 
 154. Davis, Speech, supra note 152, at 8. 
 155. Sargent, Speech, supra note 153, at 4. 
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Arizona Senate Bill 1070—of America being ―overrun‖ by ―illegal aliens‖ 
and transformed into Mexico.
156
 Reminiscent of present-day tactics, the 
vilified alien ―Chinaman‖ was depicted as a reservoir of crime—anti-
Chinese advocates accused China of sending to America masses of its 
unwanted criminals.
157
 The crimes associated with the ―Chinamen‖ 
included selling and buying their women, gambling, prostitution, thievery, 
and violence against whites.
158
  
In another echo of present-day fierce politics, political opponents 
campaigned against a weakened presidential administration by whipping 
up anti-immigrant sentiment. National politics of the age was closely 
divided, with shifting control of Congress and the presidency between 
sparring political parties.
159
 Two presidents were elected on close splits, 
with a bare majority of less than 25,000 votes, and two ―minority 
presidents‖ failed to win a majority of the vote.160 Prefiguring present-day 
politics saturated with cries for deliverance from an alleged ―alien 
invasion,‖ a ―Committee of Fifty‖ assembled in San Francisco decried the 
President and national government for ―wantonly den[ying] to the people 
of the Pacific . . . relief from a scourge that menaces their very 
existence‖—the ―invasion of the subjects of the Mongolian empire.‖161  
In this fractious broil, state and local laws were deployed in an attempt 
to expel the Chinese both directly and indirectly through licensing, 
housing, and criminal laws. In 1849, the Supreme Court held in The 
Passenger Cases that states may not intrude on the federal power to 
regulate foreign commerce by imposing passenger head taxes on ships 
entering a port.
162
 Anti-Chinese legislatures repeatedly attempted end-runs 
around prohibitions against interference. Justice McLean, author of one of 
the eight opinions in The Passenger Cases, suggested that while ―the 
municipal power of a State cannot prohibit the introduction of foreigners 
 
 
 156. Russell Pearce, Arizona Takes the Lead on Illegal Immigration Enforcement, SOC. 
CONTRACT, Summer 2010, at 244, 246 (2010) (asking rhetorically: ―How long will it be before we 
will be just like Mexico?‖). 
 157. E.g., 1877 SENATE OF CAL. REPORT, supra note 153, at 31–32; Philip A. Roach, Senator of 
the District of Monterey and Santa Cruz, Minority Report on the Bill to Enforce Contracts for Labor 
Within the State of California (Mar. 20, 1852), reprinted in Winn, Valedictory Address, supra note 
153, at 7, 8–9. 
 158. 1877 SENATE OF CAL. REPORT, supra note 153, at 5, 20–31 (women in servitude); Winn, 
Valedictory Address, supra note 153, at 5 (describing gambling dens and ―other dark dens where 
crimes that cannot be named are habitually committed‖). 
 159. ELMER CLARENCE SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 111 (1939). 
 160. Id. 
 161. ADDRESS BY THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTY TO THE PEOPLE 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.oac 
.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb7t1nb2fw/?order=2&brand=oac4. 
 162. Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283 (1849). 
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brought to this country under the authority of Congress,‖ the state could 
―guard its citizens against diseases and paupers‖ by denying foreigners 
residence unless ―security‖ was posted ―to indemnify the public should 
they become paupers.‖163 Seizing on this suggestion, the California 
legislature in 1852 enacted a law requiring a bond of $500 per non-citizen 
passenger.
164 
 
By 1855, the legislature grew bolder and enacted a direct tax titled ―An 
Act to Discourage the Immigration to this State of Persons Who Cannot 
Become Citizens Thereof‖165 aimed at deterring immigration by non-
whites, who could not become citizens because Congress had limited 
naturalization to ―a free white person.‖166 The law required shipmasters or 
owners to pay a prohibitively-high fifty dollar head tax for bringing in 
persons ―incompetent‖ to become a citizen—that is, non-whites.167 The 
California Supreme Court struck down the law two years later in People v. 
Downer.
168
 Downer involved California‘s attempt to levy $12,750 in head 
taxes on a ship bearing 250 Chinese passengers.
169
 On the authority of The 
Passenger Cases, the California Supreme Court ruled that the capitation 
tax was an impermissible interference with the federal power to regulate 
foreign commerce.
170
 
In 1858, the California legislature tried again to steer immigration 
policy via a state law, titled ―An Act to Prevent the Further Immigration of 
Chinese or Mongolians to this State‖—which forbade Chinese or 
Mongolians from entering the state or its ports.
171 
The act subjected 
Chinese landing in the state and their transporters to fines or imprisonment 
for not less than three months nor more than a year.
172 
In an opinion never 
 
 
 163. Id. at 406 (McLean, J.). 
 164. Act of May 3, 1852, ch. 36, §§ 1–2, 1852 Cal. Stat. 78, 78–79, repealed by Act of Apr. 27, 
1945, ch. 111, § 5, 1945 Cal. Stat. 424, 465. The 1852 Act was struck down by the California Supreme 
Court two decades later in State v. Steamship Constitution, 42 Cal. 578, 589–90 (1872), as an 
impermissible interference in foreign commerce. 
 165. Act of Apr. 28, 1855, ch. 153, §§ 1–2, 1855 Cal. Stat. 194, repealed by Act of Mar. 30, 1955, 
ch. 46, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 487, 487–88. 
 166. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 
414. 
 167. § 1, 1855 Cal. Stat. at 194. 
 168. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169 (1857). 
 169. Id. at 169. 
 170. Id. at 171. 
 171. Act of Apr. 26, 1858, ch. 313, § 1, 1858 Cal. Stat. 295, 295–96, repealed by Act of Mar. 30, 
1955, ch. 46, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 487, 487–88. 
 172. Id. §§ 1–2. 
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reported, the California Supreme Court declared that law unconstitutional 
too.
173
 
Seeking alternative ways to drive out the Chinese, the state legislature 
turned to licensing, taxes, employment, and housing laws. The legislature 
revived a license fee of three dollars per month tax on foreign miners,
174
 
an approach previously used to drive out Latin American miners.
175
 
Unsatisfied, a committee of the California Assembly recommended an 
outright ban on Chinese miners by 1855—―perhaps the high-water mark 
of anti-Chinese sentiment in the legislature for the entire decade.‖176 
Though the proposal failed, the legislature doubled taxes to six dollars per 
month, with annual increases of two dollars per month for foreigners 
―ineligible to become citizens of the United States‖177—a prohibitively 
high and expanding sum that had the manifest object ―to drive the subjects 
of it—the Chinese—from the State.‖178 Businessmen worried about the 
impact on trade with China and missionaries repelled by the racism of the 
law later succeeded in reducing the amount to four dollars per month.
179
  
In 1862, the legislature levied another anti-Chinese tax in legislation 
formally titled ―An Act to Protect Free White Labor Against Competition 
with Chinese Coolie Labor, and to Discourage the Immigration of the 
Chinese into the State of California,‖180 and dubbed the ―Anti-Coolie 
Act.‖181 The same year, the California Supreme Court struck down the 
latest attempt to drive out the Chinese as an impermissible interference 
with the federal power to regulate commerce, including the flow of foreign 
peoples.
182
 
Concerned about the increasingly hostile environment, the Chinese 
government in 1867 asked American minister Anson Burlingame to head a 
 
 
 173. See Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 538 (1862) (recounting that the Supreme Court 
informed counsel of this history from the bench). 
 174. Act of May 4, 1852, ch. 37, § 6, 1852 Cal. Stat. 84, 85, repealed by Act of Apr. 26, 1939, ch. 
93, 1939 Cal. Stat. 1067, 1215. 
 175. Doris Marion Wright, The Making of Cosmopolitan California: An Analysis of Immigration 
1848–1870, 19 CAL. HIST. SOC‘Y Q. 323, 330 (1940). 
 176. CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 17 (1994). 
 177. Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 536 (1862) (quoting Act of Apr. 30, 1855, ch. 174, 1855 
Cal. Stat. 216). 
 178. See id. (summarizing the account of anti-Chinese laws by lawyers for Lin Sing). 
 179. MCCLAIN, supra note 176, at 18–20. 
 180. Act of Apr. 26, 1862, ch. 339, § 1, 1862 Cal. Stat. 462, 462, repealed by Act of May 16, 
1939, ch. 154, 1939 Cal. Stat. 1274, 1376 (exempting those engaged in the manufacture of sugar, rice, 
coffee, and tea).  
 181. THE ROCKY ROAD TO LIBERTY: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY OF CHINESE IMMIGRATION AND 
EXCLUSION 215 (Sen Hu & Jielin Dong eds., 2010). 
 182. Lin Sing, 20 Cal. at 565–66, 575–80. 
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goodwill delegation to the United States.
183
 Burlingame brokered the 
Burlingame Treaty in 1868.
184 
Facilitated by American hopes for opening 
up trading opportunities through friendlier relations with the Chinese,
185
 
the treaty recognized ―the mutual advantage of the free migration and 
emigration‖ of Chinese and American nationals and provided that 
―Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States shall enjoy the 
same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or 
residence, as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most 
favored nation.‖186  
Though desire for trade shaped more hospitable national immigration 
policy, intense anti-Chinese animosity in a few states, prominently 
California, fomented conflicting policies. California was particularly 
reeling from the 1870s recession, which was the worst the nation had 
experienced.
187
 Playing on the unrest sparked by widespread 
unemployment, mortgage foreclosures, and homelessness, radicals called 
for extreme anti-Chinese measures and related constitutional reforms.
188 
Rabble-rousers such as Dennis Kearney of the self-styled ―Workingmen‘s 
Party,‖ led fierce anti-Chinese campaigns.189 The politics of anger gave 
rise to the California Constitution of 1879, which included an article, 
simply titled ―Chinese.‖190 The new constitutional provision directed the 
legislature to protect against ―the burdens and evils arising from the 
presence of aliens who are or may become vagrants, paupers, mendicants, 
criminals, or invalids afflicted with contagious or infectious diseases, and 
from aliens otherwise dangerous or detrimental to the well-being or peace 
of the State . . . .‖191 The provision also barred corporations from 
employing any Chinese or Mongolian and forbade the employment of 
Chinese in any state, county, municipal, or other public work ―except in 
punishment for crime.‖192 The state‘s new provision declared: ―The 
presence of foreigners ineligible to become citizens of the United States is 
 
 
 183. For a history, see, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 592 (1889); Charles 
J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First 
Phase, 1850–1870, 72 CAL. L. REV. 529, 561 (1984). 
 184. McClain, supra note 183, at 561. 
 185. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 592. 
 186. Treaty of Trade, Consuls, and Emigration, U.S.-China, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739, 740. 
 187. Harry N. Scheiber, Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Historical Perspective on the 1879 
California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35, 36–37 (1989). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 39–40. 
 190. CAL. CONST., art. XIX, § 1 (repealed Nov. 4, 1952). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. §§ 2–3. 
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declared to be dangerous to the well-being of the State, and the Legislature 
shall discourage their immigration by all the means within its power.‖193 
In this environment of repeated state defiance and divergence from 
federal immigration policy, the Supreme Court decided the central case of 
Chy Lung v. Freeman. At issue in the case was a California statute levying 
a $500 bond on any incoming ship passenger that a state-appointed 
―Commissioner of Immigration‖ designated as ―lunatic, idiotic, deaf, 
dumb, blind, crippled, or infirm‖ or otherwise ―likely to become a public 
charge, or has been a pauper in any other country, or is from sickness or 
disease . . . a public charge, or likely soon to become so, or is a convicted 
criminal or a lewd or debauched woman.‖194 In those days, Supreme Court 
Justices would ―ride circuit,‖ travelling through the states to staff circuit 
courts in the absence of an intermediate tier of appellate judges to staff the 
circuit courts.
195
 Justice Field, riding circuit, had earlier ordered the release 
of Chinese women detained under the provision, ruling that ―the 
intercourse of foreigners with our people, their immigration to this country 
and residence therein, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the general 
government, and is not subject to state control or interference.‖196  
In Chy Lung, the Court unanimously ruled that the law impermissibly 
intruded on the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations.
197
 Concern over interference with foreign relations shaped the 
Court‘s reasoning. The Court observed, ―[I]f citizens of our own 
government were treated by any foreign nation as subjects of the Emperor 
of China have been actually treated under this law, no administration 
could withstand the call for a demand on such government for redress.‖198 
The Court struck down California‘s latest attempt to usurp the federal 
power to regulate admission of foreign nationals in the guise of a head tax, 
underscoring the risk of imperiling foreign relations. The Court explained 
that the nation‘s constitutional structure guarded against the risk that ―a 
single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with 
other nations.‖199  
History reverberates in our times of fierce politics, a strained economy, 
a Congress rapidly shifting between closely divided parties, and a 
 
 
 193. Id. § 4. 
 194. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 277 (1875). 
 195. For a history, see, e.g., David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit 
Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1715–17 (2007) (discussing virtues of circuit riding). 
 196. In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 216 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874). 
 197. Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 278–80. 
 198. Id. at 279. 
 199. Id. at 280. 
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president besieged by these challenges. States have shifted their 
stratagems and adopted another form of law as guise for intervening in 
immigration control. The same dangers to foreign relations inhere in and 
invalidate the present enactments.
200 
 
B. Giving Due Weight to Executive Statements of Interest 
This Article is not an unqualified paean of deference to national 
enforcement policy. National policy, informed by the needs of the nation, 
can be wiser than that of disgruntled states focused on parochial 
prejudices. But history also teaches that the bulwark of the concept of 
plenary power is as mercurial as national politics. Congress overruled the 
protections and enforcement policy embedded in the Burlingame Treaty 
through the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
201
 The national executive is 
best situated to balance competing foreign policy interests, but the national 
executive also is subject to the vicissitudes of Congress. Unless and until 
Congress intervenes to check executive enforcement judgment, however, 
substantial weight should be accorded the position of the national 
executive charged with executing immigration policy and managing 
foreign affairs. 
The issue of the weight due to executive branch statements on the 
propriety of state immigration offenses and enforcement is an important 
one because the Obama administration has opposed the new state 
immigration laws. Faced with managing the foreign policy ramifications 
of the aggressive state legislation, the federal government has taken the 
unusual step of suing to enjoin the two most internationally controversial 
and aggressive of the new breed of state laws, the immigration laws in 
Alabama and Arizona.
202
 The complaints and declarations by executive 
officials document the foreign policy consequences of the spate of laws. 
Deputy Secretary of State Burns attested that the divergent state policies 
do not merely rouse ire from foreign nations—they renege on foreign 
policy commitments by the United States to other nations.
203
 Deputy 
 
 
 200. Cf. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 366–69 (9th Cir. 2011) (Noonan, J., concurring) 
(writing that Arizona Senate Bill 1070 is unconstitutional because of its expressed state policy of 
diminishing the number of unlawful immigrants, conflicting with national immigration policy—a 
subset of foreign policy). 
 201. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 592 (1889) (giving history and ruling 
that the Act trumps the Treaty‘s protections). 
 202. Complaint, United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (No. 2:11-CV-
2746-SLB); Complaint, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-
01413). 
 203. Declaration of William J. Burns, supra note 82, ¶ 34. 
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Secretary Burns reported that these states‘ actions have harmed the 
interests of the whole nation by risking retaliatory reciprocal treatment of 
U.S. citizens abroad; antagonizing foreign nations; and impairing 
cooperation in counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and trade.
204
 The 
Obama Administration continues to oppose the state interference before 
the Supreme Court, following the grant of certiorari in the widely watched 
Arizona v. United States.
205
  
The Supreme Court opined in dicta in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that 
―there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight 
to the executive branch‘s view of the case‘s impact on foreign policy.‖206 
The Court also noted, however, that another approach could be case-
specific deference to the political branches.
207
 In Republic of Austria v. 
Altmann, the Supreme Court indicated that U.S. government statements on 
foreign policy implications that are particularized to the petitioners and 
conduct in a case ―might well be entitled to deference as the considered 
judgment of the Executive on a particular question of foreign policy.‖208 
Altmann‘s guidance was dicta too, however, because the government did 
not issue a particularized opinion in the case. Against this backdrop of 
ambiguity, the lower courts tend to accord deference to Statements of 
Interest by the United States regarding foreign policy.
209
  
Outside the foreign policy or national security domains of special 
executive competence, however, deference is less frequent or predictable. 
This is demonstrated by the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Chamber 
of Commerce v. Whiting, regarding a challenge by the Chamber of 
Commerce to the Legal Arizona Workers Act.
210
 The law makes it a state-
law offense to ―knowingly‖ or ―intentionally‖ employ ―an unauthorized 
alien‖ defined by incorporating the federal-law definition of illegal 
status.
211
 The law also mandates that employers verify the employment 
 
 
 204. Id. ¶ 10. 
 205. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011).  
 206. 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). 
 207. Id. 
 208. 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004).  
 209. See, e.g., Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co., 431 F.3d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 2005) (deferring to 
Statement of Interest in dismissing suit seeking to recover against Austria for Nazi-era deprivations on 
political question grounds); Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (deferring to 
Statement of Interest in dismissing suit against Japan brought by former World War II-era ―comfort 
women‖ conscripted into sexual slavery); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(allowing suit by Bosnian victims to proceed and noting that the United States, far from opposing the 
suit, sent a letter indicating it could proceed). 
 210. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011). 
 211. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(A)–(B) (1995 & 2011 Supp.).  
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eligibility of new hires using the E-Verify system.
212 
Under federal law, E-
Verify is only a voluntary-use pilot program, in part because of concerns 
for the risk of error and resultant discrimination. The mandates are backed 
by penalties centered on licensing revocation, relying on a savings clause 
for ―licensing and similar laws‖ in the express preemption provision of the 
federal Immigration Reform and Control Act.  
The Supreme Court ruled the Legal Arizona Workers Act was valid 
under the licensing savings clause even though the United States filed an 
amicus curiae brief arguing the Arizona employment law was 
preempted.
213
 In upholding the law, the Court selectively relied on parts of 
the government‘s brief and past statements.214 The Chamber of Commerce 
argued that the Arizona Act‘s mandate requiring employers use the federal 
E-Verify system to check employee status conflicted with the more 
flexible federal scheme that offered E-Verify as an optional alternative 
verification system.
215
 In rejecting that contention, the majority 
underscored that the United States had pointed to Arizona‘s mandate 
regarding use of E-Verify as a permissible use of the system.
216
 In the 
plurality portion of the opinion,
217
 Chief Justice Roberts relied on 
representations by the United States as amicus curiae that the E-Verify 
system could accommodate the increased use by Arizona and other states 
of E-Verify and that E-Verify had a successful accuracy and participant 
satisfaction record.
218
  
The crucial differences between the new breed of laws pending before 
the courts and the act upheld in Whiting are the comprehensive caste-
creation strategy and impingement on the foreign relations power posed by 
the new laws. The new breed of laws are a multi-front totalizing attack 
directed at creating a suspect caste—and are far more intrusive than mere 
―[r]egulating in-state businesses through licensing laws[, which] has never 
been considered such an area of dominant federal concern.‖219 In objecting 
to the new laws, U.S. enforcers are not merely advancing contrary 
statutory interpretation on a question of statutory preemption. The United 
 
 
 212. Id. § 23-214(A). 
 213. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Chamber of 
Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (No. 09-115). 
 214. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Justice Thomas did not join Part III.B of the opinion, which discusses the claim of obstacle 
preemption based on overburdening the E-Verify system.  
 218. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1986 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, supra note 213, at 31, 34). 
 219. Id. at 1983.  
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States is attempting to ameliorate the adverse impact on foreign policy, an 
area of traditional national dominance.
220
 Accordingly, substantial 
deference is due the statements of interest regarding foreign policy 
submitted by the United States and particularized to the new state laws 
intervening in, and contravening, federal enforcement policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Enforcement policy defines the immigration law that operates in 
reality, and the Constitution‘s structural balance was crafted to govern in 
reality. The structural balance allocating foreign affairs power to the 
national government was struck based on the lessons of experience. Under 
the failed Articles of Confederation, the fledgling nation suffered the 
consequences of a conflicting patchwork of policies regarding foreign 
intercourse and quickly chose a wiser long-term course.
221
 The nation 
learns and jurisprudence develops from the lessons of experience. Recent 
experience and the lessons of the past have shown the need to protect 
against rebellious interference that undermines the greater interests of the 
nation against creation of a suspect denigrated caste and imperilment of 
foreign policy interests. 
 
 
 220.  
While under our constitution and form of government the great mass of local matters is 
controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to foreign countries and 
their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers . . . the exercise of which can 
be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire 
territory. 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889). 
 221.  
To guard against the recurrence of these evils, the Constitution has conferred on Congress the 
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the States. That, as regards our 
intercourse with other nations and with one another, we might be one people,—not a mere 
confederacy of sovereign States for the purposes of defence or aggression. 
Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283, 462 (1849). 
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